Leadership and Policy Innovation--From Clinton to Bush: Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Joseph R. Cerami

Author:Joseph R. Cerami [Cerami, Joseph R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Arms Control, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9780415527828
Google: 2iJzl1vTlV8C
Goodreads: 13711982
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2012-08-17T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: TRANSACTIONAL AND PARTICIPATORY LEADERSHIP AND CHANGE— MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for institution building include aspects of intra and interstate as well as international relations. For instance, in the Nunn-Lugar case, early support was lacking from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80). On the US side, new organizations were formed within existing Cold War agencies, such as the reorganization and new missions assigned in the transition from the US Defense Nuclear Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which included the newly chartered On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was founded to support early post-Cold War counterproliferation initiatives.22

In comparison, the later failed North Korean framework relied on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring and enforcement. Later, in 2000, the last Cohen Defense Report points out the signifi- cance of the Agreed Framework freezing North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under IAEA inspections (Cohen 2000, p. 11). The resulting collapse of the North Korean international monitoring and enforcement again provides a contrast to the effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Nunn-Lugar programs with included host agencies, such as MINATOM and DTRA, engaged directly. In comparing these two cases, the evidence to date suggests the critical importance of host country involvement in actively supporting monitoring and enforcement arrangements.23

The phrase “lengthening the shadow of the future” again portrays the important perception of institutional arrangements as enhancing the prospects of future benefits and costs. In other word, the potential for future payoffs lends support for institution building. Writing in 1999, Carter and Perry emphasize the successes of Nunn-Lugar in the early post-Cold War period (pp. 77–79). In addition, they project forward to highlight continuing counterproliferation work. In particular, they note that Russia still possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce between 25,000 and 80,000 nuclear weapons. Therefore, they propose reinventing Nunn-Lugar with expanding program budgets with greater latitude for nuclear audits and inspections and a new arms control regime. The call is for an expansion of Nunn-Lugar for safeguarding fissile materials. The initiative in expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Program proliferation regimes is echoed in recent work by the Carnegie Foundation and again by Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center (Perkovich et al. 2005; Allison 2004).

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